"Breaking the Law Under Competitive Pressure." Forthcoming in Law and Philosophy. Published version February 2019.
When a business has competitors that break an incompletely enforced, burdensome law, is it morally required to obey this law, or may it break the law to avoid an unfair competitive disadvantage? Many non-skeptical theories of the obligation to obey the law cannot give this question a clear answer. A broadly Kantian account, by contrast, can explain why businesspeople ought to obey laws of certain types even under competitive pressure.
"Exploitation, Deontological Constraints, and Shareholder Theory." Forthcoming in Georgetown Journal of Law and Public Policy.
One of the central controversies in normative business ethics is the question whether transactions and economic relationships can be wrongfully exploitative despite being mutually beneficial and consensual. This article argues that anyone who accepts a shareholder theory of business ethics should accept deontological constraints on mutually beneficial, consensual exploitation.
"Paying People to Risk Life or Limb." Forthcoming in Business Ethics Quarterly. Final manuscript (PDF, 354KB)
Drawing on Kantian ethical theory, this paper defends two ethical claims about workplace safety. First, the content of a hazardous job affects the moral permissibility of offering it. Second, employers typically cannot justify omitting expensive safety measures by paying employees more, even if employees prefer higher pay to greater safety.
"Corporations and Justice." With Alan Strudler. Forthcoming in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Overview of recent literature on the extent of corporations' ethical obligations to address social and transactional injustices.
"Would Many People Obey Non-Coercive Law?" Jurisprudence 9 (2018): 361-367. Published version November 2017.
In response to Frederick Schauer's The Force of Law, I argue that the available evidence indicates that non-coercive law could influence many people's behavior. It may sometimes be best to forgo coercive enforcement of an important law.
"Imprisonment and the Right to Freedom of Movement." In Chris W. Surprenant, ed., Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration, Routledge 2018. Final manuscript (PDF, 100KB) (Please cite the published version.)
Government’s use of imprisonment raises distinctive moral issues. Even if government has broad authority to make and to enforce law, government may not be entitled to use imprisonment as a punishment for all the criminal laws it is entitled to make.
"Responsive Government and Duties of Conscience." Jurisprudence 5 (2014): 244-264. Accepted manuscript (PDF, 393KB) (Please cite the published version.)
All citizens, including those with minority views about political justice, should have meaningful opportunities to try to make the law conform to their reasoned political views. Without such opportunities, citizens who judge the law to be partially unjust cannot avoid violating one of two pro tanto moral duties.
"Justifying Community Benefit Requirements in International Research." Bioethics 28 (2014): 397-404. Full text (PDF, 107KB)
Sponsors of medical research often conduct clinical trials in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for interventions that will be marketed primarily in high-income countries. This paper examines what research sponsors must do for host communities to make research in LMICs ethical. I argue that sponsors often owe something to the broader community to avoid unfairly burdening or free-riding on public resources.
"Law and the Entitlement to Coerce." In Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa, eds., Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law, Oxford University Press 2013. Final manuscript (PDF, 541 KB) (Please cite the published version.)
Many assume that whenever government is entitled to make a law, it is entitled to enforce that law coercively. I argue that the justification of legal authority and the justification of governmental coercion come apart. Both in ideal theory and in actual human societies, governments are sometimes entitled to make laws that they are not entitled to enforce coercively.
"Law and Coercion." Philosophy Compass 8 (2013):231-240. Full text (PDF, 73 KB)
Political philosophers have generally assumed that coercion is fundamental to law, but many legal philosophers have doubted this. This paper explores the reasons for these doubts. It then examines why political philosophers and some legal philosophers have been reluctant to treat the possibility of non-coercive law as significant.
"Individual Risk and Community Benefit in International Research." Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (2012): 626-629. Full text (PDF, 82 KB)
A predecessor of the above-listed paper on the ethics of human subjects research in LMICs, this paper examines what research sponsors ethically must do for host communities if research presents a net medical risk to subjects. If this net risk is significant, as it sometimes is in early-phase trials, research must benefit subjects' communities to avoid making an unreasonable appeal to subjects' altruism.