"Would Many People Obey Non-Coercive Law?" Forthcoming in Jurisprudence. (You may contact me for the manuscript.)
In response to Frederick Schauer's The Force of Law, I argue that the available evidence indicates that non-coercive law could influence many people's behvaior. It may sometimes be best to forego coercive enforcement of an important law.
"Imprisonment and the Right to Freedom of Movement." In Chris W. Surprenant, ed., Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration, Routledge 2018.
Manuscript (PDF, 95KB) (Please cite the published version.)
Government’s use of imprisonment raises distinctive moral issues. Even if government has broad authority to make and to enforce law, government may not be entitled to use imprisonment as a punishment for all the criminal laws it is entitled to make.
"Responsive Government and Duties of Conscience." Jurisprudence 5 (2014): 244-264. Abstract and text
All citizens, including those with minority views about political justice, should have meaningful opportunities to try to make the law conform to their reasoned political views. Without such opportunities, citizens who judge the law to be partially unjust cannot avoid violating one of two pro tanto moral duties.
"Justifying Community Benefit Requirements in International Research." Bioethics 28 (2014): 397-404. Full text (PDF, 103 KB)
Sponsors of medical research often conduct clinical trials in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) for interventions that will be marketed primarily in high-income countries. This paper examines what research sponsors must do for host communities to make research in LMICs ethical. I argue that sponsors often owe something to the broader community to avoid unfairly burdening or free-riding on public resources.
"Law and the Entitlement to Coerce." In Wil Waluchow and Stefan Sciaraffa, eds., Philosophical Foundations of the Nature of Law, Oxford University Press 2013. Abstract (You may contact me for the full text.)
Many assume that whenever government is entitled to make a law, it is entitled to enforce that law coercively. I argue that the justification of legal authority and the justification of governmental coercion come apart. Both in ideal theory and in actual human societies, governments are sometimes entitled to make laws that they are not entitled to enforce coercively.
"Law and Coercion." Philosophy Compass 8 (2013):231-240. Full text (PDF, 73 KB)
Political philosophers have generally assumed that coercion is fundamental to law, but many legal philosophers have doubted this. This paper explores the reasons for these doubts. It then examines why political philosophers and some legal philosophers have been reluctant to treat the possibility of non-coercive law as significant.
"Individual Risk and Community Benefit in International Research." Journal of Medical Ethics 38 (2012): 626-629. Full text (PDF, 82 KB)
A predecessor of the above-listed paper on the ethics of human subjects research in LMICs, this paper examines what research sponsors ethically must do for host communities if research presents a net medical risk to subjects. If this net risk is significant, as it sometimes is in early-phase trials, research must benefit subjects' communities to avoid making an unreasonable appeal to subjects' altruism.